Audience first, product second · Chapter 2 of 3
A Sewing Machine and a Pizza Round
On a thousand pounds, a garage, and a channel nobody was charging for yet.
3 min read
Ben Francis was nineteen. He was at university in the West Midlands and delivering pizzas, and in 2012 he started Gymshark with Lewis Morgan out of his parents' garage.
The equipment was a sewing machine and a screen printer, bought with about a thousand pounds of his own savings.
Start there, because it is the same detail as the Scuffers chapter and it keeps mattering. Owning the means of production at that scale is not about margin. It is about the size of a mistake.
If you can make twenty of something this week, you can be wrong on Monday and right by Friday. You can change a fit because one person said the shoulders were off. You can test six graphics and keep one. Nothing you get wrong is expensive enough to end anything, which means you can afford to be wrong constantly, which is the only known way of finding out what people want.
A brand that outsources its first run of a thousand pieces has bought one guess. A brand with a screen printer in a garage has bought an unlimited number of small ones.
In 2013 the company took a stand at a fitness trade show at the arena in Birmingham and sold out of everything on the first day. That is the moment a garage operation discovers the demand is not imaginary, and trade shows remain one of the very few places a tiny brand can stand in front of several hundred of its exact customers in an afternoon.
Now the part everybody quotes, and usually misreads.
Gymshark sent free clothing to fitness YouTubers.
The standard retelling is that Gymshark invented influencer marketing, and the standard conclusion drawn from it is that you should send free clothing to influencers. That conclusion is worth almost nothing today, because the channel has been priced.
Here is what actually happened. In 2012 there were people making videos about lifting weights who had devoted, specific audiences and essentially no commercial value, because no company had worked out that those audiences were worth anything. Reaching them cost the price of a parcel.
The advantage was not the influencers. The advantage was being early to a channel nobody had started charging for.
Every attention channel in history has had that window. Wholesale had one. Shop windows on the right street had one. Printed catalogues had one. Instagram had one, and by the time everybody agreed it worked, the price had risen to meet the value and the advantage was gone.
So the transferable question is not which influencers to use. It is: where are people paying real attention right now, in a place nobody has monetised yet, and can I get there before the rate card exists?
The last piece is the niche, and it is the same shape as Lululemon two books along.
Gymshark did not start as fitness apparel. It started as clothing for people who lift weights, which is narrower, and the narrowness is what made it spread. A tight group compares notes constantly. Serve them completely and they do the distribution you cannot afford to buy; serve everybody who exercises partially and nobody has any reason to mention you.
Line up the founding sums in this subject and the pattern is impossible to miss. Six hundred euros between two students. A local screen printer. A thousand pounds and a garage. A thousand euros in Provence.
None of these are stories about money.
He sent free clothes to people who lifted weights on the internet, before anybody had a word for that.
Where you'll meet this
The people he gave clothes to were not celebrities. They were fitness YouTubers with committed audiences and no commercial value that anyone had priced, which is exactly why it worked and why it costs a fortune now.