Learning · Chapter 3 of 3
A Theory Whose Name Was Backwards
On a famous theory whose name turned out to be backwards.
4 min read
In 1967 Martin Seligman and Steven Maier ran an experiment with a detail that makes it worth taking seriously.
Dogs were given electric shocks. One group could stop the shock by pressing a panel. A second group received exactly the same shocks, at the same times, for the same durations (yoked to the first group so that the physical experience was identical) but could do nothing about them.
Later, both groups were placed in a box where escaping the shock required only stepping over a low barrier. The first group learned to escape almost immediately. The second group largely did not try. Many lay down and took it.
The yoking is what makes the study strong. Both groups had the same amount of shock, so the shock itself cannot be the cause. The only difference was control, and something about its absence carried over into a new situation where control was available.
Seligman called it learned helplessness, and it became one of the most influential animal models of depression for four decades. It suggested that depression could be produced by an environment rather than only by a disposition or a chemistry, which made a great deal of sense of the association between depression and unemployment, poverty, institutional life and abusive relationships, all situations in which outcomes are substantially outside the person's control.
It was extended to humans by Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale in 1978, because a problem had appeared: people given uncontrollable outcomes did not all become passive. Some did, some did not, and the difference tracked how they explained the failure.
The reformulation proposed that what matters is attributional style. A person who explains a setback as internal ("it's me"), stable ("it always will be") and global ("it affects everything") will generalise the helplessness to future situations. A person who explains it as external, temporary and specific: "that test was badly set" Will not. The style is measurable, predicts later depressive symptoms in longitudinal studies, and is modifiable, which is why it became a target for cognitive therapy.
And then in 2016 Maier and Seligman published a paper saying the theory had been backwards from the beginning.
Fifty years of neuroscience had accumulated in the meantime, and it pointed somewhere uncomfortable. Prolonged, uncontrollable aversive stimulation activates circuits in the dorsal raphe nucleus that produce passivity and anxiety directly. No learning is involved. Passivity in the face of prolonged aversive events is the default, unlearned response of the mammalian nervous system.
What the escapable group learned was the presence of control. Detecting control engages prefrontal circuitry (the ventromedial prefrontal cortex) which inhibits the raphe response. And once that circuit has been engaged, it is easier to engage again, which is why prior experience of control protects against later uncontrollable events.
So helplessness is not learned. Control is. The name has been wrong for half a century.
This is more than a correction to a label, because it changes what an intervention should be aiming at. If helplessness is a learned belief, you argue with the belief. If passivity is the default and control is the discovery, you have to supply evidence of control, and the evidence has to be detected, which is not the same as being told.
That distinction explains something most organisations get wrong. When people stop raising problems after several rounds of suggestions going nowhere, the standard response is an announcement inviting feedback, sometimes with a new form. It reliably does nothing, because the missing ingredient is not permission. It is a detected instance of raising something and the thing changing.
One visible case does more than any number of invitations, which is also why the first such case has to be handled far more carefully than the twentieth.
The related finding is that perceived control does real work even when it is nominal. Participants given a button they believe will stop an unpleasant noise tolerate it better, and tolerate it better even when they never press it. Studies in care homes and workplaces have found that giving people small genuine choices (over plants, schedules, arrangements) affects mood and in some studies health outcomes.
That is not a licence to hand out placebo buttons, and there are plenty of those in the world; the crossing signals in many cities do nothing. It is a finding about what the nervous system is monitoring for. What suppresses the default passivity is the detection of a contingency between what you do and what happens, and the system is, on this evidence, looking for it fairly hard.
The missing ingredient is not permission. It is a detected instance of raising something and the thing changing.
Where you'll meet this
Participants given a button they believe stops a noise tolerate it better even when they never press it. What suppresses passivity is the detection of a contingency.